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American courts routinely pay homage to Benjamin Cardozo’s classic statement in Meinhard v. Salmon (1928)
that fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries a ‘duty of the finest loyalty’ that is ‘stricter than the morals of the
marketplace.’ In practice, however, courts rarely set aside fiduciary decisions in the absence of an
unauthorized conflict of interest or other flagrant abuse of power. Critics argue that this divergence between
fiduciary law’s uncompromising rhetoric and the more modest reality of judicial deference is an
embarrassment.

My new paper, ‘Fiduciary Law’s Mixed Messages,’ argues that this critique is misplaced. Drawing on ideas
developed in a previous article, I argue that the divergence between fiduciary law’s conduct rules and decision
rules comes into clearer focus when viewed from the perspective of republican legal theory.
Republicans contend that individual liberty is compromised by ‘domination,’ understood as subjection to
another party’s arbitrary control. The fiduciary duty of loyalty is necessary, on this account, to prevent
fiduciaries from exercising arbitrary power over the legal and practical interests of their principal and
beneficiaries.
Republican theory supports Cardozo’s assertion that fiduciaries are subject to the most exacting legal standards
of fidelity, solicitude, and diligence. The uncompromising requirements of fiduciary loyalty are necessary to
affirm that fiduciaries formally lack authority to dominate their principal and beneficiaries. Nonetheless,
courts must defer to fiduciaries’ discretionary decisions when judicial intervention is more susceptible to
arbitrariness—and, hence, more dominating—than fiduciary decisionmaking would be alone. The republican
theory thus suggests that the disjuncture between fiduciary law’s conduct rules and decision rules is a
principled feature of American fiduciary law, not a bug.
The republican theory also offers a significant practical payout by clarifying when courts should defer to
fiduciary judgments. In particular, it suggests that the degree of deference courts accord to fiduciary
judgments should turn on two considerations: (1) whether or not the fiduciary has been entrusted with
discretionary power to decide the relevant issue; and (2) whether the fiduciary or the judiciary is in a better
position to resolve the relevant issue in a manner that tracks the principal’s purposes and the beneficiary’s best
interests.
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The following table summarizes how these two criteria offer a framework for judicial review of fiduciary
decisionmaking:

Fiduciary Exercises Entrusted
Discretion

Fiduciary Does Not Exercise
Entrusted Discretion

Fiduciary Has Superior
Expertise

Strong deference: arbitrary and
capricious review

Weak deference: respectful
consideration

Judiciary Has Superior
Expertise

Strong deference: arbitrary and
capricious review

No deference: de novo review

As the paper explains, this framework justifies prevailing standards of review in most respects, including
American corporate law’s ‘business judgement rule.’ But it also offers resources for refining judicial standards
of review in other fields of fiduciary law where courts have struggled to explain how deferential standards of
review can be reconciled with the strict requirements of fiduciary loyalty.
Evan Criddle is Cabell Research Professor of Law at the William & Mary Law School.
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